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Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law
Professor Steven L. Schooner
George Washington University Law School
Washington, D.C.
1. Introduction
Sometimes the most simple questions prove the most vexing. For example, what does
your government hope to achieve through its government procurement law? It is possible to
draft and enact a new law without answering the question, and experience demonstrates that this
is often the case. (Arguably, it is equally challenging to sustain a commitment to these objectives
over time, but that is a topic for another day.) Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to attempt to
describe general aspirations for a procurement system before drafting begins.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to articulate objectives for a procurement system.1 There are
many options, and most are contradictory.2 This paper will briefly address nine goals frequently

1

“The Federal Government has been making contracts for as long as it has existed, yet
little attempt has been made to rationalize this phase of governmental activity in its relation to the
functions of government and to the persons and firms with whom contracts are made.” John
Wm. Whelan & Edwin C. Pearson, “Underlying Values in Government Contracts”, 10 Pub. L.
298 (1962) (“suggest[ing] the need for such an explanation and rationalization”). Professor
Whelan notes that: “Government contracts obviously fulfill one prime function: they are vehicles
for the acquisition or disposal of property, performance of services or other such governmental
ends may involve the use of promissory obligations.” Ibid. at 302. He then catalogs four
subsidiary functions: “(1) the expression of general public policy, (2) policies for the safeguard of
government integrity, (3) imposition of government controls on contract performance and (4)
reflections of certain intragovernmental relations.” Ibid. at 303.
2

This reflects not only government procurement, but the nature of government. See
Richard Stillman II, The American Bureaucracy: the Core of Modern Government 360-94 (2d
ed., 1996), distinguishing the Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, and Madisonian normative models and
conceding that:
American have never made up their minds... as to which of the
(continued...)
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identified for government procurement systems: (1) competition; (2) integrity; (3) transparency;
(4) efficiency; (5) customer satisfaction; (6) best value; (7) wealth distribution; (8) risk
avoidance; and (9) uniformity. The author do not suggest this list is exhaustive, nor do the
author expect that each individual label will resonate with all readers. Nonetheless, the list
provides sufficient options to generate significant debate amongst scholars, policy makers,
legislators, and, of course, buyers and sellers.

2. Three Overarching Principles: Competition, Transparency, and Integrity
At a macro level, the author prefers to begin with three “pillars” that, in my opinion,
underlie the United States procurement system: system transparency; procurement integrity; and
competition.3 In the United States, we believe that, as a general rule, our government enjoys
access to the best contractors, lowest prices, most advanced technology, favourable contract
terms and conditions, and the highest quality goods and services. We think this is so because our
system, for the most part, encourages participation by the widest possible pools of potential
competitors; it consistently demonstrates that competitors will be impartially considered for

2

(...continued)
three models they prefer... From time to time, the stress has been
placed on promoting the values of administrative efficacy... at
other times, accountability to the general public has predominated;
and at still other times, responding to diverse interest group
demands has clearly been an overriding priority. Yet, within any
single historic period where one value has held sway over the other
two, the others have never been entirely neglected or ignored.

Ibid. at 366 (emphasis added).
3

To be clear, however, this perception is not universally accepted. Compelling
arguments can be made for alternative desiderata.
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award of our contracts; and it treats all contractors in a manner that balances appropriate risks
with meaningful profit incentives and rewards. There are plentiful exceptions to this description,
and a number are identified below.
We promote competition because we believe in the power of the marketplace.4 By
maximizing the effective use of competition, the government receives its best value in terms of
price, quality, and contract terms and conditions.5 Contractor motivation to excel is greatest
when private companies, driven by a profit motive, compete head-to-head in seeking to obtain
work. Yet, maintaining a robust competitive regime requires more than a commitment to the

4

We believe the marketplace thrives because of human self-interest, which proves far
more effective than legislated or regulated mandates or policies. As Adam Smith wrote over two
hundred years ago:
[E]very individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of society as
great as he can. He generally neither intends to promote the public interest, nor
knows how much he is promoting it. . . . He intends only his own gain, and he is
in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which
was no part of his intention.
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (ed. Edwinn Canaan, University of Chicago Press, 1976)
pp.477. See also, Helen Joyce, “Adam Smith and the Invisible Hand,” Math.Plus, at
http://plus.maths.org/issue14/features/smith/index.html.
The system in which the invisible hand is most often assumed to work is the free
market. Adam Smith assumed that consumers choose for the lowest price, and
that entrepreneurs choose for the highest rate of profit. He asserted that by thus
making their excess or insufficient demand known through market prices,
consumers “directed” entrepreneurs’ investment money to the most profitable
industry. Remember that this is the industry producing the goods most highly
valued by consumers, so in general economic well-being is increased.
5

See generally, the Competition in Contract Act of 1984 (CICA), Pub. L. No. 98-369,
Div. B., Title VII, 98 Stat. 1175 (July 18, 1984); 10 U.S.C. § 2304; 41 U.S.C. § 253. CICA
imposed upon the procurement system the now well accepted standard of “full and open
competition,” which “when used with respect to a contract action, means that all responsible
sources are permitted to compete.” 48 C.F.R. § 6.003.
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marketplace. Accordingly, we promote and sustain contractor participation by instilling integrity
and transparency into the system.
By use of the word integrity, we mean to describe rules of conduct for procurement
personnel in the government and private industry. 6 Bribery, favouritism, or unethical behaviour
have no place in a successful procurement system.7 Our regulatory mandate is clear:
Government business shall be conducted in a manner above
reproach and . . . with complete impartiality and with preferential
treatment for none. Transactions relating to the expenditure of
public funds require the highest degree of public trust and an
impeccable standard of conduct. The general rule is to avoid
strictly any conflict of interest or even the appearance of a conflict
of interest in Government-contractor relationships. While many
Federal laws and regulations place restrictions on the actions of
Government personnel, their official conduct must, in addition, be
such that they would have no reluctance to make a full public
disclosure of their actions.8
Our ground rules attempt to ensure fair treatment and ethical behaviour. Private industry expects
fair evaluation of its proposals to do contract work. Government agencies expect contractors to

6

For a more extensive discussion, see generally, Rand Allen, “Integrity: Maintaining a
Level Playing Field,” in this issue ____.
7

An extensive statutory and regulatory construct is intended to limit both actual and
apparent conflicts of interests involving government procurement officials. See 48 C.F.R. § 3.1.
See also, generally 18 U.S.C. § 201, discussing gratuities and bribes. It is unlawful to offer, give,
solicit or accept gifts (or things of value) to or by government employees. “Gift includes any
gratuity, favor, discount, entertainment, hospitality, loan, forbearance, or other item having
monetary value.” 5 C.F.R. § 2635.503 (emphasis in original). The same regulations define
“prohibited source” as “any person who: (2) Does business or seeks to do business with the
employee's agency . . .” 5 C.F.R. § 2635.203(d) (emphasis added). Although the Office of
Government Ethics has promulgated a number of de minimus exceptions, the exceptions are just
that – exceptions to the prohibition. See generally, Standards of Ethical Conduct by Employees
of the Executive Branch, 5 C.F.R. § 2635; <http://www.usoge.gov/>.
8

48 C.F.R. § 3.101-1.
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compete solely upon the merits of their demonstrated capabilities and the quality and price of
their offers, rather than their influence on government officials. This mutual trust, bolstered by
meaningful oversight,9 not only sustains but enhances the competitive environment.
By system transparency, we mean a system employs procedures by which offerors and
contractors (and even the public at large) ensure that government business is conducted in an
impartial and open manner.10 Professor Sue Arrowsmith suggests that, in a transparent system,

9

The need for oversight of the procurement system implicates issues far broader than
minimizing the frequency of collusion or incidence of fraud. This is not to suggest that
elimination of fraud and collusion is not important - it is. Rather, it reflects the existence of an
over-arching compliance regime, predicated upon an intricate web of statutory and regulatory
requirements that define the procurement system. Our rule-bound regime reflects thoroughly
western values and judgements regarding ethics, and many nations would argue that we cast our
net too broadly in describing corruption. See Kenneth U. Surjadinata, “Comment: Revisiting
Corrupt Practices from a Market Perspective”, 12 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 1021, 1026 (1998)
(arguing, inter alia, that developing states see the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act “as a culturally
arrogant encroachment on their ability to govern activities exclusively within their borders, in
accordance with international law principles on territorial sovereignty.”). In procurement,
compliance indicates not just high standards of integrity, but also the maintenance of system
transparency, the maximization of competition, and the furtherance of a host of Congressionally
mandated social policies. Any one of these issues opens to door to a host of pitfalls. For
example, integrity in public procurement implicates issues related to, inter alia, personal and
organizational conflicts of interest, gratuities, bribes, handling and disclosure of proprietary
source selection information, contractor certification of compliance with numerous social
programs (such as contractor size status, disclosure of cost or pricing data, or origin of end
products delivered), contractor maintenance of a drug-free workplace, contractor allocation fo
specified unallowable costs to specific pools, appropriate supervision and cooperation by
government employees, proper use by contractors of mandated supplies or raw materials, faithful
execution by contractors of inspection and testing provisions, etcetera. Despite the complexity of
the Federal procurement system and the reality that this complexity subjects the system to
criticism, the statutory and regulatory regime is intended to hold contractors or government
personnel accountable for compliance with Congressional mandates.
10

See generally, Sue Arrowsmith, “Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Transparency
in Government Procurement”, 47 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 793, 796 (1998). In the broader context of
transparent government, see the excellent resource, Transparency International, the global
coalition against corruption, at http://www.transparency.org/.
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the affected parties clearly know both the rules to be applied in conducting procurements as well
as information on specific procurement opportunities.11 Transparency is maintained in many
ways. We publish all of the statutes, regulations, and rules that define our procurement process.12
We announce our government’s requirements – what we expect to purchase – for all the world to
see.13 We clearly articulate in every solicitation how offerors will be evaluated. We notify all of
the unsuccessful offerors (and members of the public who request the information) which offeror
received the award and for what amount. We debrief unsuccessful offerors and explain to them
how all of the rules and regulations were followed.14 We provide for protest procedures, 15 where

11

See ibid. Further, Proferssor Arrowsmith explains that transparency:
ensure[s] that procurement decisions are based only on
considerations regarded as ‘legitimate’ within the system. . . [It
also] supports the goals of procurement systems by encouraging
and facilitating participation by suppliers. Publicity for
procurement opportunities, the application of clear and accessible
rules, and the assurance that these rules will be adhered to all mean
that suppliers are more willing and able to bid. There is less risk
that their participation will prove wasteful. . . .

47 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. at 796-97.
12

For example, visit the GPO Access Site at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/index.html for all Federal statutes, regulations, and related
materials or, more specifically, visit the Federal Acquisition Regulation site at
http://www.arnet.gov/far/.
13

The Government publicizes its pending requirements in print and on the Internet
through the Commerce Business Daily (CBD). See generally, 48 C.F.R. § 5.101(a)(1);
http://cbdnet.gpo.gov.
14

In negotiated government procurements, excluded offerors are entitled to prompt
debriefings. 10 U.S.C. § 2305(b)(6)(A); 41 U.S.C. § 253b(f)-(h).
15

The Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 33.101, defines “protest” as:
(continued...)

Publication pending at 11 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW REVIEW 103 (2002) – Draft Page 6

independent third parties and attorneys for the unsuccessful offerors can review all of the agency
records.16 We employ appropriate oversight, such as government Inspectors General,17 to audit
15

(...continued)
a written objection by an interested party to any of the following:
(a) A solicitation or other request by an agency for offers for a
contract for the procurement of property or services. (b) The
cancellation of the solicitation or other request. (c) An award or
proposed award of the contract. (d) A termination or cancellation
of an award of the contract, if the written objection contains an
allegation that the termination or cancellation is based in whole or
in part on improprieties concerning the award of the contract.

16

Protest procedures can benefit both the parties involved and the procurement system in

general.
When the Congress has laid down guidelines to be followed in
carrying out its mandate in a specific area, there should be some
procedure whereby those who are injured by the arbitrary or
capricious action of a governmental agency or official in ignoring
those procedures can vindicate their very real interests, while at the
same time furthering the public interest. . . .
Scanwell Laboratories v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1970), following Judge Frank’s
analysis in Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.),
vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). The court further articulated that: “The public interest in
preventing the granting of contracts through arbitrary or capricious action can properly be
vindicated through a suit brought by one who suffers injury as a result of the illegal activity, but
the suit itself is brought in the public interest by one acting essentially as a “private attorney
general.” 424 F.2d at 864. The court adopts the “view . . . that government officers were making
contracts on behalf of the government, that Congress is also a participant in the exercise of the
government's proprietary functions, and that the most practicable way to keep the government's
contracting officers within their statutory powers is by letting complainants . . . obtain judicial
review of the officers' action.” 424 F.2d at 866, citing, 3 Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative
Law Treatise 220 (1958). Finally, the court summarized that: “If there is arbitrary or capricious
action on the part of any contracting official, who is going to complain about it, if not the party
denied a contract as a result of the alleged illegal activity? It seems to us that it will be a very
healthy check on governmental action to allow such suits . . . as a watchdog of government
activity. . . .” 424 F.2d at 866-67.
17

The Inspectors General are expected, among other things, to (1) conduct and supervise
audits and investigations, (2) recommend policies for activities designed to promote economy,
(continued...)
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agency actions.18 Yet it is important to remember that, in the private sector, transparency is
rarely considered, let alone valued at a premium.19 Accordingly, transparency often proves
antithetical to what are perceived as commercial practices. Nonetheless, to the extent that the
public’s funds are being spent, we believe that maintaining transparency is worthwhile. Further,
transparency helps to ensure integrity which, in turn, promotes competition.
Yet, as mentioned above, there is no universal agreement that a procurement system
should be premised solely upon transparency, integrity, and competition. Other goals merit
discussion.

3. Competing Aspirations
One of the most popular aspirations of the 1990's U.S. acquisition reform movement was
the concept of efficiency.20 Critics of the U.S. system suggest that, historically, efficiency was
not a fundamental goal of the procurement process and, arguably, our system is designed to

17

(...continued)
efficiency, and effectiveness, and (3) prevent and detect fraud and abuse. The Inspector General
Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C.A. Appx § 2.
18

See also the Defence Contract Agency website at http://www.dcaa.mil.

19

“Numerous laws designed to ensure transparency, rationality, and accountability in
decision making, including the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Freedom of
Information Act, apply to agencies, and not to private actors.” Jody Freeman, “The Private Role
in Public Governance,” 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 586-87 (citations omitted) (2000).
20

Steven L. Schooner, “Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure Of Businesslike
Government,” 50 Am. Univ. L. Rev. ____ (forthcoming 2001).
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thwart efficiency. 21 Yet in any transaction involving commerce, efficiency plays an important
role. When we talk about efficiency in this context, we focus primarily upon administrative or
transactional efficiency (although the concept could be applied in a far broader context).22 In

21

In fact, there is at least one instance where Congress has legislated that administrative
efficiency is not an absolute priority. “The reduction of administrative or personnel costs alone
shall not be a justification for bundling of contract requirements unless the cost savings are
expected to be substantial in relation to the dollar value of the procurement requirements to be
consolidated.” 15 U.S.C. § 644(e)(2)(C)(emphasis added).
22

To determine program efficiency, an organization would simply
measure the cost per mile swept. But to determine policy
efficiency, it would have to measure the cost to achieve a desired
level of street cleanliness, by whatever method – street sweeping,
prevention, community self-help. Finally, to measure program
effectiveness, a city might measure citizen satisfaction with the
level of street cleanliness. But to measure policy effectiveness, it
might ask citizens whether they wanted their money spent keeping
the streets clean, or whether alternative uses, such as construction
or repaving, would be preferable.
David Osborne & Ted Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is
Transforming the Public Sector 22 (1992), note 256 at 354 (emphasis in original). See also
Herbert A. Simon, Victor A. Thompson & Donald W. Smithburg, Public Administration 488510 (1991) (discussing the meaning of efficiency and suggesting that the term is vague and
ambiguous).
Because of the ethical views that prevail . . . , because efficiency is
generally regarded as something desirable, the word is a political
symbol of considerable potency. It has the power of organizing
sentiment behind the proposals to which it is attached. Most
people feel they ought to be efficient, and that they ought to want
efficient government.
It is not surprising, therefore, that many debates in our
political scene about “efficiency” are really debates about what
values government should implement.
Ibid. at 510-11 (emphasis in original).
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other words, a procurement system is efficient when it spends the least amount of resources in
the process of purchasing what is needed. A system that employs the fewest possible people to
do the required purchasing consumes less resources.23 Specifically, fewer buyers means less
money spent on salaries for buyers. If your buyers are overworked, however, such a system
becomes more expensive, because your buyers fail to obtain the best prices.24 Hence, buyers may

23

The present political climate in the United States reflects a seemingly mindless
obsession with reducing the size of the Federal workforce. See generally, Vice President Al
Gore, The Best Kept Secrets in Government: A Report to President Bill Clinton 1, 207 (GPO,
1996) (reflecting that the Executive Branch, excluding the independent Postal Service, has “the
smallest workforce in 30 years”). One of the related by-products of this effort is increasing
pressure to contract out traditional government services. Without addressing the risks associated
with contracting out or privatizing inherently governmental functions, this pressure results in
increased costs.
DoD acquisition organizations stated that reductions in in-house . .
. support personnel required the[m] to contract for additional
services, such as engineering and logistical analysis, that the
Government once would have provided. As a result, technical
support costs increased because . . . obtaining contract support was
more expensive than obtaining in-house . . . support. . . . [C]ontract
labor rates are significantly higher [$20,000 to $180,000] per staff
year than rates . . . charged for the same service performed by
Government employees.
Inspector General Report, Acquisition Workforce, supra note 69 at 18. See also Richard Stillman
II, The American Bureaucracy: The Core of Modern Governement, 307-309 (2d ed. 1996)
(suggesting that the growth of contracting out has “tended to be discussed elsewhere, the
procurement workforce has borne the brunt of the downsizing frenzy. Congress incrementally
mandated a 55 percent reduction of the Federal acquisition workforce between 1989 and 2001.
See generally, the National Defense Authorization Act for 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 922, 113
Stat. 512, 724 (October 5, 1999).
24

Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, DOD Acquisition Workforce
Reduction Trends and Impacts, Report d-2000-088 (February 29, 2000) (visited August 1, 2000)
<http://dodig.osd.mil/audit/reports/00-088.pdf>. This study identified, among many others, the
following effects of the personnel reductions: (1) increased backlog in closing out completed
contracts; (2) insufficient staff to manage requirements; (3) reduced scrutiny and timeliness in
(continued...)
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pay too much for what they buy.
We also have increased our emphasis upon the concept of best value25, or what some call
value for money.26 In other words, we aspire to focus upon getting the best deal – or the best
bargain – for the public’s money. Such an emphasis seems logical. Unfortunately, the pursuit of
best value typically requires greater buyer resources, from market research to negotiation.
Similarly, obtaining best value may not always please the customer (for example, if the customer
requires premium quality regardless of price).
Also, in the 1990's, the U.S. procurement system increased its emphasis on obtaining
customer satisfaction for end users. It makes sense for buyers to try to please those for whom
they serve. Unfortunately, pleasing end users, especially if the end user favours specific
suppliers or demands that goods be provided quickly, frequently results in less competition and
higher prices,27 or simply embarrassing policy decisions.

24

(...continued)
reviewing acquisition actions; (4) difficulties retaining personnel; and (5) insufficient contract
surveillance. Ibid. at 17-20.
25

“‘Best value’ means the expected outcome of an acquisition that, in the Government’s
estimation, provides the greatest overall benefit in response to the requirement.” 48 C.F.R.
§2.101.
26

For example, see the vision statement of the United Kingdom’s Office of Commerce:
“To work with civil government as a catalyst to achieving best value for money in commercial
activities.” http://www.ogc.gov.uk/ogc/isite.nsf/index.html.
27

Focus on customer satisfaction may cause buyers to “place inordinate weight on
product quality[,]” skewing the expected price-quality tradeoffs. William Kovacic,
“Procurement Reform and the Choice of Forum in Bid Protest Disputes,” 9 Admin. L.J. Am. U.
461, note 33 at 486-87 (1995), citing Robert C. Marshall, Michael J. Muerer, & Jean-Francois
Richard, “The Private Attorney General Meets Public Contract Law: Procurement Oversight by
Protest,” 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, note 160 at 7-8 (1991).
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Historically, our elected representatives have viewed our procurement system as a vehicle
to distribute wealth.28 For example, our government has chosen to leverage its purchases to
support domestic firms and, more specifically, small businesses.29 At the same time, our

28

The author does not believe that wealth distribution is one of the procurement system’s
primary goals. This does not suggest that the Congress does not use the procurement system to
attempt to redistribute wealth. But those efforts are transitory for the same reasons they are
controversial. Two examples demonstrate the never-ending turbulence affecting social policies.
First, in the same year that Congress increased the government-wide goal for small business
participation in federal procurement from 20 to 23 percent, it extended the Small Business
Competitiveness Demonstration (Comp-Demo) Program. The Comp-Demo favors big
businesses by stopping agencies from setting aside contracts for small business in four selected
industries in which small businesses have proven themselves competitive. Second, Congress
effectively gutted its affirmative action contracting program by mandating that the Defense
Department (representing 60 percent of government buying) suspend use of price preferences for
disadvantaged firms following any year in which the five-percent participation goal is met. See
Steven L. Schooner, “Mixed Messages: Heightened Complexity In Social Policies Favoring
Small Business Interests”, 8 P.P.L.R. CS78, CS82-83 (No. 3, 1999). Moreover, wealth
distribution is merely a subset of the larger phenomenon of burdening the procurement process
(or, for that matter, the process of governing) with efforts to promote social policies. These
social policies, in addition to those that potentially distribute wealth to domestic manufacturers,
essential military suppliers, and small (and small disadvantaged and women-owned) businesses,
also mandate drug-free workplaces, occupational safety standards, compliance with labor laws,
preferences for environmentally friendly purchasing practices, etcetera. Accordingly, while the
author concedes that Congressional manipulation of the procurement process is a significant
aspect or feature of the system, the author cannot agree that wealth distribution is a fundamental
purpose of the procurement regime.
29

For a taste of the ever-evolving mandates that burden the U.S. procurement process.,
see 48 C.F.R. Part 19 (Small Business Programs, including preferences for disadvantaged
businesses and women-owned businesses), Part 22 (Application of Labor Laws to Government
Acquisitions), Part 23 (Environment, Conservation, Occupational Safety, and Drug-Free
Workplace), Part 25 (Foreign Acquisitions (or domestic preferences)); 48 C.F.R. Subpart 26.1
(Indian Incentive Program), Subpart 26.3 (Historically Black Colleges and Universities and
Minority Institutions). See, also, the recent Federal Acquisition Regulation amendments
implementing Executive Order 13101, at 65 Fed. Reg. 36016 (June 6, 2000), amending 48 C.F.R.
§§ 4.3, 11.0, 11.3, 23.4, 23.7 (including affirmative programs to procure environmentally
preferable products or services, such as products or services "that have a lesser or reduced effect
on human health and the environment when compared with competing products or services that
serve the same purpose" and mandating the use of paper with a minimum recycled content,
Publication pending at 11 PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW REVIEW 103 (2002) – Draft Page 12

procurement dollars may be directed towards specific manufacturers to maintain sufficient
expertise or industrial base capacity in anticipation of future contingencies. You may target your
buying towards contractors located in geographical areas of high unemployment. It is axiomatic
that government spending can influence behaviour and infuse growth in communities and
economic sectors. Conversely, efforts to redistribute wealth through the procurement system –
by their very nature – restrict competition.30 Quite simply, as various constituencies or special
interest groups compete for their perceived “fair share of the pie,” others are left wanting.
It is difficult to describe a procurement regime without acknowledging the role of risk
avoidance. Avoiding undue risk is a fundamental responsibility of any governing body.
Conversely, improper obsession with risk avoidance can suffocate creativity, stifle innovation
and render and institution ineffective. Further, there are infinite mechanisms available to control
different types of risk. For example, in the United States, the concept of responsibility is used to
filter out undesirable or incompetent contractors.31 The manner in which the government’s needs

29

(...continued)
etcetera.).
30

Moreover, the controversial nature of these policies often lead to strong incentives to
avoid them. See generally, Mark Cancian, “Acquisition Reform: It’s Not as Easy as it Seems”,
Acquisition Rev. Q. 189, 191 (Summer 1995), clarifying that:
These goals are often regarded as illegitimate by people inside the
system because they have no direct bearing on national security or
on acquisition. Indeed, they look like the workings of powerful
special interests trying to bend society’s rules in their favor.
However, democracy is a messy form of government. One
person’s selfish special interest is another’s vital national priority.
31

To be determined responsible, a contractor must have adequate financial resources; be
able to comply with the required schedule; have a satisfactory performance record; have a
(continued...)
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are described – for example, whether design or performance specifications are utilized – can shift
performance risks between contracting parties.32 Different types of contracts – ranging from firm
fixed price to cost reimbursement vehicles – modulate the government’s exposure to potential
cost overruns.33 In addition, the termination for convenience clause permits the government to
avoid performance where its need for the contracted items has evaporated or been overtaken by
events.34
Finally, another valuable systemic goal is frequently lost in efforts to achieve some or all
of the previously discussed policies. Nonetheless, the importance of uniformity, particularly in
maximizing transparency, competition, and efficiency, among others, cannot be overstated. A
uniform procurement system suggests that all government instrumentalities buy the same way,
following the same laws, rules, and practices. Such a system is efficient because sellers do not
need to learn new rules in order to do business with different agencies or departments. Further, it
is much easier to train all of the government’s buyers, and it permits buyers greater flexibility to
work for various agencies or departments during their careers. In addition, if the government

31

(...continued)
satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics; have the necessary organization, experience,
accounting and operational controls, and technical skills; have the necessary production,
equipment and facilities; and be otherwise qualified and eligible under applicable laws and
regulations. 48 C.F.R. § 9.104-1.
32

See 48 C.F.R. § 11.002(a)(2).

33

See generally 48 C.F.R. Part 16.

34

See generally 48 C.F.R. Part 49; 48 C.F.R. §§ 52.249-1, -2.
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consistently uses standard provisions and clauses,35 the process operates more smoothly.36
Transactions become more routine. All parties to the transaction understand the rules to the
game.

4. Conclusion
Ultimately, each government must decide how much discretion or flexibility it wishes to
delegate to its buyers.37 For each individual transaction, greater buyer flexibility should result in
higher customer satisfaction and better value for money. For all of your transactions, taking a

35

For an informative table identifying all of the required or optional government-wide
provisions and clauses, organized by the numerous contract types utilized by the government (for
example, fixed-price supply, cost-reimbursement supply, fixed-price research and development,
cost-reimbursement construction, time and materials, commercial item, etcetera.), see the
provision and clause matrix at 48 C.F.R. § 52.301.
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Steven L. Schooner, “Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure Of Businesslike
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For example, the author is concerned that the U.S. reforms of the 1990 provided buyers
discretion to act in a businesslike fashion at the expense of oversight and bureaucratic control.
In this regard, readers may find Malcolm Sparrow informative:
The nature and quality of regulatory practice hinges on which laws
regulators choose to enforce, and when; on how they focus their
efforts and structure their uses of discretion; on their choice of
methods for procuring compliance. Yet the vogue prescriptions
for the reinvention or reform of government . . . say little about
these issues and sometimes ignore them altogether. The popular
prescriptions for reform focus on service, customers, quality, and
process management, not on compliance management, risk control,
or structuring the application of enforcement discretion. They rely
heavily on management tools and methods imported from the
private sector, which has few comparable challenges.
Malcolm K. Sparrow, The Regulatory Craft: Controlling Risks, Solving Problems, and
Managing Compliance 2 (2000) (emphasis added).
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systemic view, broad delegations of discretion or flexibility may reduce transparency and
competition. Accordingly, this discretion may entail a lack of control that may threaten public
confidence in your procurement system.
No system can achieve all of these goals. Nor can a state expect that its objectives for its
system will remain constant over time. Determining which goals are most important is a
daunting, ever-evolving challenge.
Because no system can achieve all of the goals here (or the many not discussed), your
desiderata entails important tradeoffs. There are significant transactional, economic, and social
costs associated with maximizing transparency, integrity, and competition. Nonetheless, the
author believes these costs are an excellent long-term investment.
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